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a b s t r a c t
This paper identifies a common political struggle behind debates on the validity and permissibility of
animal experimentation, through an analysis of two recent European case studies: the Italian imple-
mentation of the European Directive 2010/63/EC regulating the use of animals in science, and the recent
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) ’Stop Vivisection’. Drawing from a historical parallel with Victorian
antivivisectionism, we highlight important threads in our case studies that mark the often neglected
specificities of debates on animal experimentation. From the representation of the sadistic scientist in
the XIX century, to his/her claimed capture by vested interests and evasion of public scrutiny in the
contemporary cases, we show that animals are not simply the focus of the debate, but also a privileged
locus at which much broader issues are being raised about science, its authority, accountability and
potential misalignment with public interest. By highlighting this common socio-political conflict un-
derlying public controversies around animal experimentation, our work prompts the exploration of
modes of authority and argumentation that, in establishing the usefulness of animals in science, avoid
reenacting the traditional divide between epistemic and political fora.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The debate around the use of (non-human1) animals in science2
is an old one, and despite important differences and developments
since the 19th century, one can only be struck by the underlying
continuity in its themes. Both camps have ready-made narratives to
explain the history of such debate. Antivivisectionists generally
invoke a narrative of moral progress gradually elevating non-
human animals from soulless machines (Descartes, 1637) or mere
instruments (Kant, 1785) to beings that matter morally in virtue of
their capacity to suffer (Bentham, 1789; Singer, 1975; Regan, 1983),
and/or of the relationship we entertain with them (Donaldson &
Kymlicka, 2013). In contrast, supporters of animal experimenta-
tion are quick to brand antivivisectionists as conservatives resisting
Abbreviations: AAMR, Association for the Advancement of Medicine by Research; ECI, European Citizens’ Initiative; EU, European Union; FRAME, Fund for the
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* Corresponding author. Department of Experimental Oncology, Istituto Europeo di Oncologia (IEO), IFOM-IEO Campus, via Adamello 16, 20139 Milano, Italy.
** Corresponding author.
*** Corresponding author. Department of Experimental Oncology, Istituto Europeo di Oncologia (IEO), IFOM-IEO Campus, via Adamello 16, 20139 Milano, Italy.
E-mail addresses: Pierre-luc.Germain@ieo.it, germain@hifo.uzh.ch (P.-L. Germain), Luca.Chiapperino@unil.ch (L. Chiapperino), giuseppe.testa@ieo.it, giuseppe.testa@
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1 Here we refer, by the term “animals”, to non-human animals (see Derrida, 2006 on the presuppositions implied in this habit).
2 In different places and time, participants in the debate have instead used the expression vivisection. A number of commentators (e.g. Working Group of the Oxford Centre
for Animal Ethics, 2015, p.13) have argued that it was preferable to use the expression “animal experimentation” because it is broader and arguably more exact (strictly
speaking, vivisection means live dissection, which comprises only a subset of animal experimentation). Given that choices of words are seldom neutral e in fact scientific and
medical interests have refrained from using “vivisection” because it sounded too gruesome (French, 1975, p. 267) e we have tried where possible to follow the actors’ own
terms.
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an arguably progressive science, and resort to the spectacular ad-
vances of science and its allegedly massive impact on human (and
sometimes even animal) welfare to justify the necessity of animal
experimentation. In this view, the regulated use of animals in
research is an exemption, for the greater good, from our general
concerns for animals, and a fair compromise (interestingly, the
majority of scientists considers that regulations regarding animal
experimentation is “about right”, independently of the specific
country or legislation concerned e see Cressey, 2011). Such
persistent juxtaposition of narratives prompts to ask why e if the
story is one of two forces of progress which, in a dynamic balance,
ineluctably push history towards its realization e the debate has
been continuing with so little change through more than a century
of social and scientific developments, and with no apparent closure
in sight (Gregory, 2000). Apparently, we e setting aside, for a
moment, the identity of this curious “we” e are still very much
adjusting our ideas on the ideal compromise between imperatives
of scientific and moral progress. To be sure, this lack of closure does
not amount to a standstill, since advances, technical and discursive
alike, are being made. Yet, they are unfolding in a manner that
invigorates both camps in the pursuit of their rehearsed narratives.
Take recent evidence on promising alternatives to animal experi-
mentation such as tissue-engineering (Vries et al., 2015) and pitch
it against transforming breakthroughs on the feasibility of dis-
secting biological function in vivo, including in non human pri-
mates (Cyranoski, 2014; Song and Knoepfel, 2016). Or take some of
the genuinely new ideas developed by moral philosophy on the
issue of animal rights (DeGrazia & Beauchamp, 2015) and consider
them in light of the fundamental problem of what it could or ought
to mean to represent the interests of non-human animals in an
ideal deliberative setting (Kitcher, 2015). It appears then that the
persistent tension on this issue, and indeed one key enabling
resource for both camps in marshalling ever new evidence in their
support, rests on a fundamental disagreement about who judges
competing scientific evidence and decides on a binding moral
collective stance.
In this paper, we investigate these discourses and debates
through a socio-political analysis of the role of animal experi-
mentation in Europe, by drawing a connection between the origins
of modern antivivisectionist movements in Victorian Britain and
some of its most important European descendants today. We
contend that a historical perspective on the onset of modern anti-
vivisectionism highlights threads that have persisted through to-
day’s debates, but could easily escape the commentator focusing on
the contemporary events alone. In the view we propose, animals
are at least as much the focus of human moral consideration as a
privileged locus at which the place of science in society is articu-
lated and scrutinized. We argue that behind widespread and his-
torically situated rhetorics on the ‘evil of vivisection’ lies a common
political struggle: the attempt to keep the scientific Golem (Collins
& Pinch, 1993) under public control and prevent its capture by
politically unaccountable powers. This is obviously not to say that
care for animals in our societies did not play an important role in
changing attitudes towards them e caring for pets did for instance
play an immense role in shaping these attitudes (Kean, 1998). Yet,
our paper shows that the antivivisection discourse arguably differs
from other discourses on animal welfare in that it brings to the fore
a contestation of the place of science in the public sphere. For this
reason, antivivisectionism cannot be explained solely by means of
the moral sentiments and values characterising the concern for
animal welfare, but also demands looking at the social spaces,
opposed interest groups and political leanings that give shape to
the epistemic and moral value of animals, and thus contribute to
structure the place of science in contemporary societies.
To thread this claim we start from the vast work by historians
on the onset of modern antivivisectionism in late 19th and early
20th century, in order to show how antivivisectionist movements
emore than just grappling with the question of animals’ intrinsic
moral interests e enshrined a deeper political concern for
asymmetries of power both embodied in and sustained by indi-
vidual scientists and their work. We then turn to the analysis of
two recent cases in which similar features can be observed. The
first is concerned with the Italian debate surrounding the
implementation of the European Directive 2010/63/EC regulating
the use of animals in biomedical research. The Italian case is
particularly interesting because it represents a prototypical and
powerful example of how contemporary debates, while still
questioning the accountability of science, have moved the
question from the need to oversee scientists’ treatment of animals
to the scrutiny of the social contract for science as an authorita-
tive and reliable system of knowledge-production (Gibbons,
1999), especially in terms of its immunity to private economic
interests. This transformation takes its full-blown form in the
case we analyse in the third section, namely the recent European
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) ‘Stop Vivisection’, which explicitly ad-
dresses animal experimentation as a matter of negotiating the
governance of science and its role in promoting a community’s
collective project. In the face of a controversy that is still un-
derway, the paper concludes that highlighting the common
socio-political disagreement at the basis of our case studies
fleshes out a core testing ground for regulatory and normative
closure of public controversies surrounding animal experimen-
tation, and provides broader reflections on science and its posi-
tion in an open society (Popper, 1962).
2. The origins of modern antivivisectionism
To understand the nature of the debate on animal experi-
mentation, it is useful to look at what is generally considered
the birthplace of modern antivivisectionism: Victorian Britain.
This is not to say that animal experimentation was not practised
earlier, nor that there was no debate as to its legitimacy, but
that it “did not develop into a major, public controversy” until
then and there (Rupke, 1987, p. 1). Debates emerging elsewhere
in the Western world were strikingly similar (Rupke, 1987), and
most often explicitly modelled onto the British movement
(French, 1975, p. 233). Our aim, here, is not to attempt a history
of the movement, but to build on the work of historians to pick
up relevant and often neglected threads that appear more
useful than previous narratives for the analysis of the current
debates.
The Victorian antivivisection movement was largely religious
and conservative in background, its politically powerful allies were
nearly all of Tory allegiance and it enjoyed little support from the
working poor (French, 1975; especially p.236e239; see also; Kean,
1998). In fact, it was born out of Puritans’ broader program of
reformation of the masses, and was therefore dismissed as sheer
hypocrisy byMarxists (Marx and Engels 1948, p.31; Lafargue,1881).
It was a complex phenomenon, simultaneously weaving in ele-
ments of a reactionary, bourgeois Christian movement, with femi-
nist aspects along with the first signs of resistance (on the side of
declining elites) to some emerging powers, especially those of
medico-scientific elites.
The public figure who influenced it most was Frances Power
Cobbe, a fierce militant of the Royal Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals before she founded the Society for the Protection
of Animals Liable to Vivisection. Of note, Cobbe was a meat-eater and
did not believe in animal rights (Elston, 1987, p. 276; see also;
Rupke, 1987, p. 5), which is particularly illustrative of the nature of
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the movement.3 In fact, if animal cruelty was constantly depicted in
antivivisection literature, it was not only (and arguably not even
primarily) out of care for the animals, but to question the morality of
experimenters4. For instance, a particularly influential antivivisec-
tion pamphlet recounting a physiology lecture does not simply
describe the cruel experiments, but emphasizes especially how
comical the physiologists were finding them (Hageby & Schartau,
1903). Similarly, an American physician attending lectures by
Magendie (a reputed vivisector and mentor of Claude Bernard)
noted “Monsieur M. has not only lost all feeling for the victims he
tortures, but he really likes his business.When the animal squeaks a
little, the operator grins; when loud screams are uttered, he
sometimes laughs outright.” (cited in Olmsted, 1944). More than
being just morally repugnant, vivisectors inspired fear and
conjured an image of the scientist as driven by an unquenchable if
not perverse curiosity, prone to débordements beyond humanitye
as famously illustrated by H.G. Wells’ “Dr. Moreau” (1896).5 People
readily identified with the laboratory animals (Kete, 2002, p. 29) to
the point that there was literally a “fear of being vivisected” (Miller,
2009, p. 336). As antivivisectionists saw it:
“There is no argument in favor of Vivisection which does not
applymore completely, more forcibly, tomen than to animals. If the
inferior is justly sacrificed to the higher, the legality of the sur-
render to scientific torture of idiots, criminals, those incurably
diseased, and, indeed, all ignorant and brutalized men, including
vivisectors, is beyond question.” (Cobbe, 1890, pp. 5e6; see also;
Buettinger, 1997, p. 864, p.864).
Such connections between laboratory animals and the power-
less members of our society have been framed as “ontologies of
vulnerability” (WGOCAE, 2015, p.30), according to which mobili-
zation and solicitude towards animals are prompted by the
vulnerability they share with the weak and voiceless in our society
(e.g. children, mentally ill). This is especially visible in the close ties
between antivivisection and feminism. Although numbers are
difficult to establish, the available evidence suggests that up to 60%
of the antivisection leadership, and three quarters of the audience
attending their meetings, were female (French, 1975, pp. 239e240).
Despite serious conflicts with parts of the feminist movement
(Mitchell, 2004), Cobbe herself was also a feminist, and both of her
battles e feminism and antivivisectionism e represented, in her
view, a broader fight against ruthless male abuses. On top of
enjoying a lower social and legal status, women perceived them-
selves also specifically as victims of the exclusively male medical
establishment. This feeling was exacerbated by the ‘Contagious
Diseases Acts’ of 1864, which subjected prostitutes (but not their
clients) to compulsory and humiliating medical examinations as
well as confinement, triggering an agitation that challenged this
public health measure on ethical grounds. A similar association is
visible in the early 1900’s Suffragette movement, which advocated
the extension of voting rights to women. Its sympathisers reacted
simultaneously to the government and to its allied, dominantly
male medico-scientific establishment (Miller, 2009). Following
strategies well-established by the earlier anti-slavery movements,
antivivisectionists therefore sought further support by framing the
movement as a broader defence of the weak against wanton power
held by the medico-scientific apparatus (French, 1975, p. 408). An
antivivisection pamphlet published during an electoral campaign
puts it quite explicitly:
“If you have a vote [.] give it to a candidate who will heartily
oppose Vivisection. You may be tolerably sure that in other ques-
tions he will support the cause of the weak against the strong, of
religion against materialism, and of the right against might.” (1880
pamphlet, quoted in French, 1975, p. 166).
The relationship with women’s issue must however also be cast
in a different light. Not enjoying professional authority, women
positioned themselves by adapting the “maternal tradition” into a
broader aesthetic and moral (often religious) standpoint, simulta-
neously claiming to represent and to educate the public (Lightman
2007).6 Along with the clergy, they framed themselves as defenders
of virtues and sentiments that the insensitive men of science failed
to heed. For while vivisectors justified the suppression of their
immediate compassion through a more abstract compassion to-
ward humanity (Boddice, 2012), this insensitivity and the very
utilitarian reason allegedly at its roots were deemed dangerous by
many (Buettinger, 1997; Carroll, 1875; Lee, 1894, p.6, p.864). In
other words, the convergence between the feminist and the anti-
vivisectionist cause was not only motivated by the ontologies of
vulnerability associating the condition of women and animals
against the backdrop of male oppression, but was also animated by
questions regarding the nature of emotions and their role in the
public sphere (Boddice, 2012;White, 2009). This can for instance be
seen in the fact that, contrary to the physiologists’ expectations, the
debate all but subsided with the introduction of anaesthesia
(Boddice, 2012). As Boddice writes, antivivisectionist fears were
principally fuelled “by physiologists’ apparent lack of regard for
them, or for public feeling at large.” (Boddice, 2012, p.16).
Pressured by the antivivisection movement, the British gov-
ernment created in 1875 a Royal Commission to regulate the
practice of vivisection. The Commission’s report recommended
special legislation which led to the Cruelty to Animals Acts of 1876
e a piece of regulation which proved very soft on scientists, and
greatly disappointing for antivivisectionists. While the Act
restricted animal experimentation and limited it to licensed sci-
entists, it put however licensing in the hands of the scientific
community. The Commission explicitly framed the problem in
terms of a trade-off between human interest in the advancement of
science and medicine and animal interests. A critical issue was, and
to a great extent still is, to evaluate the two sides of the balance:
who shall evaluate suffering and judge the importance and po-
tential benefits of an experiment?
To limit the “hindrance” (Clark, Bryant, Paget, Wilks, & Paget,
1891, p. 158) of antivivisectionism, in 1882 scientists formed the
Association for the Advancement of Medicine by Research (AAMR),
3 Obviously, many anti-vivisectionists were also promoting vegetarianism (e.g.
P.B. Shelley, H. Salt, J. Wesley, J. Ritson, J. Oswald, etc. See for instance Kean, 1998),
and issues such as slaughterhouse reforms were occasionally discussed in anti-
vivisectionist periodicals (French, 1975, p. 260). Our argument is not that antivivi-
section was insulated from other such issues, but rather that it was entirely
possible, and in fact rather common, to have strong views against antivivisection
without more general commitment to animal rights, and that antivivisection
arguably had more to do with spiritual hygiene movements than with animal
rights.
4 It was at least in part also to give subjectivity to the voiceless, pitching
compassion against utilitarian thinking. As Mayer writes, for vivisection advocates,
“To represent the animal with feelings was to confuse public discussion of the
utility of vivisection. [.] Similarly, by rhetorically transforming the animal research
subject into abstract images of volatile natural forces holding life-saving informa-
tion, vivisection advocates assumed public ownership of a rational, unsentimental
picture of the nonhuman, while effectively excluding the animal from public rep-
resentation.” (Mayer, 2009, p.201).
5 From some of Jules Vernes’ scientists to Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein” (1818)
and, in the very heat of the antivivisection movement, Wilkie Collins’ “Dr. Benju-
lia” (1883), scientists are described at best as secluded eccentrics, obsessed with
matters detached from practical concerns, and at worst as damned beings, lacking
any humanity and enlivened by a taste for cruelty.
6 Excluded and dismissed as prone to sentimentalism by the champions of sci-
ence, women came instead to be associated with mass culture, simultaneously
opposing the elitist professionalization of science and filling the niche opened by
scientists’ adversarial representation of the public.
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that was to greatly influence Government. The AAMR argued that
“lay people were unqualified to exercise judgement in a matter
involving esoteric professional knowledge” (French, 1975, p. 217),
and indeed after only a few years the responsibility for licensing
vivisection was transferred entirely to them. Complaining about
this conflict of interest, antivivisectionists would later write of the
AAMR that “[t]heir whole policy has been a policy of concealment;
or undermining that which they could not pull down, and attacking
in the rear those they feared to face.” (Zoophilist 1894, quoted in
French, 1975, p. 213). As a contemporary notes:
“A complete autocracy was claimed by the chief ministers at the
shrine of physiology, and by some few others who worshipped
before the dripping altar [.] All that the public has to do with the
matter is to find institutions inwhich the practising physiologistmay
carry on operations, which require appliances that are beyond his
private means; and all that the legislature is bound to do in the matter
is, to protect the physiologist in his practices, to the extent dictated by
his scientific purposese according to his own conscience, of which it
is presumption for ’outsiders’ to form a moral judgment.” (B. Grant,
quoted in French, 1975, p. 335, original emphasis).
In other words, while the Commission formally acknowledged
antivivisectionists’ concerns by recommending regulation, it de-
nied de facto their salience for scientific practice and even rein-
forced, by institutionalization, the autocracy of science on
regulation of animal experimentation.
This historical sketch of early antivivisectionism shows that
such social movement was never simply e and apparently not even
primarily e about protecting the interests of animals and opposing
their trade-off with human interests. At the core of the conflict lied
a broader problemwith scientists, their power and their relation to
the rest of bourgeois society. Of course, to some extent this more
overtly political dimension was also instrumentalised in the
recruitment of support for animal welfare, but the very fact that
such arguments gained traction testifies to the importance of these
political tensions. As White wrote, “the stakes (in human terms)
were the authority of laboratory practices and scientific medicine
and the role of people outside of these professions to intervene in
debates about their natures, their bodies, and the care of the ani-
mals who gave significance to their world.” (White, 2009, p.75e76)
As we shall see, much of the same unfolds in today’s debates.
3. The Italian adoption of the EU directive on animal
experimentation
The last few years have seen the emergence of a heated public
debate surrounding the European governance of animal experi-
mentation, of which we will discuss two major episodes. In this
section, we focus on the Italian debate surrounding the national
amendments to the European Directive 2010/63/EC, which regu-
lates the use of animals in biomedical research, and commits to
their progressive replacement. We show how, despite major
transformations in discourses on animal welfare throughout the
20th century, the Italian debate around the implementation of the
Directive revives, and simultaneously transforms, some of the
rhetoric and power struggles observed in the Victorian case.
The 2013 Italian delegation law n.967 (Senato della Repubblica
2013, article 13) for the implementation of the EU directive
contained several additional restrictions on animal experimenta-
tion, including (among other things) restrictions regarding
genetically-modified animals, a ban on animal use in research on
warfare and addiction, a prohibition on the breeding of dogs, cats,
and primates for scientific purposes, and a ban on xeno-
transplantation that especially threatened cancer and stem cell
research across the country.
Posing as the voice of the people, supporters of the law such as
Michela Vittoria Brambilla e a member of Parliament who also
leads the animal rights movement “La Coscienza degli Animali” e
attempted to justify these restrictions by insisting, often without
any evidence, that animal experiments are simply unnecessary for
the advancement of biomedicine.8 The vast majority of scientists
was taken aback, unable to understand the apparent arbitrariness
of the restrictions, and even unaware of the delegation law until it
was voted in Parliament on the 6th of August. Their reaction was
mostly confined to the aftermath of the law’s approval, and took
shape through the Pro-Test Italia association, a vocal non-profit
organization managed by young scientists, aimed at defending
biomedical research and “establishing a close contact between the
reality of animal experimentation and that of lay people, often un-
aware and ill-informed about it”.9 Pro-Test embraced squarely the
“deficit model” of public understanding of science (Felt & Wynne,
2007), pointing to the public and parliamentary representatives’
ignorance as the sole cause of the controversial and restrictive
implementation of the EU directive. Their strategy was thus to
highlight and disseminate “knowledge” about all the limitations of
the proposed legislation, in particular through a letter to the
members of Parliament (Pro-Test Italia 2013a). Echoing Victorian
physiologists, they also underscored the competitive disadvantage
Italian scientists would incur, with respect to scientists in other
member states, if the restrictive implementation were approved.
No doubt Pro-Test’s letter successfully debunked some prejudices
and fallacies in their opponents’ discourse (Pro-Test Italia 2013b). It
showed that major scientific publications still rely heavily on ex-
periments involving animals, and consequently that it is far from
established whether such experiments are (un)necessary to the
advancement of science10. Yet, these arguments failed to address
the deeper concerns of their opponents, namely the protection of
animal welfare and the responsibilities of science (as an institu-
tionalized, publicly-funded, collective endeavor) in promoting it.
While anti-vivisectionists welcomed the law as the beginning of
the end for the “vivisectionist empire”, and the recognition of “the
right of sentient beings who are assaulted in the name of false
science” (Lega Anti Vivisezione, 2013a), members of Pro-Test were
rather concerned with “the reasons of research and Science”;
namely, with the idea that stricter regulations on experiments
involving animals would hinder effective competition of Italian
researchers with their European colleagues. In doing so, they pre-
sented the value and necessity of animal experimentation as self-
evident and instrumental to Italian science, rather than confronting
directly the epistemic and normative disagreement on the imple-
mentation of the EU directive. The Pro-Test reaction to the dele-
gation law did not consider the possibility that the argument on
competitiveness with other European scientists did not address,
and hence could not be expected to trump, the societal concerns
7 Within the Italian legislative system, a “delegation law” (i.e. Legge Delega) is a
piece of legislation, which deputizes to the government the legislative function that
belongs, by constitutional principle, to the Parliament. A delegation law has the
objective of providing a general framework for the legislative action to be under-
taken by the government, which then issues a “legislative decree” (i.e. Decreto
Legislativo) on the designated matter of the delegation law.
8 The group’s Manifesto clearly states that animal experimentation has no “real
scientific validity” See: http://www.lacoscienzadeglianimali.it/index.php/il-
manifesto. Accessed: 06 December 2016. (See also Healthdesk, 2014.)
9 From: https://protestitalia.wordpress.com/chi-siamo. Accessed 06 December
2016. Emphasis added.
10 See Phillips and Sechzer (1989, especially pp.79e80) for a similar observation
regarding the American debate between 1966 and 1986.
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expressed by activists. Similarly to what the AAMR had done in the
face of Victorian antivivisectionism, the scientific community and
the Pro-Test activists aimed instead at lobbying the Government to
issue favorable implementation decrees to enact the approved
delegation law (amounting in this case to the implementation of
the implementation of a directive, in a powerful display of the
stratification of incremental layers of power negotiation that de-
fines the emerging European political edifice). The result was a
relative loosening of the restrictive delegation law proposed by the
Parliament, namely the interpretation of xenografts as the trans-
plantation of whole organs rather than dissociated cells, thereby
safeguarding key scientific interests (Gazzetta Ufficiale 2014).11
In sum, and contrary to the activists’ frequent claim of repre-
senting the citizenry against scientific and economic interests, the
modalities of Italy’s adoption of the EU directive show how both
camps engaged in symmetrical lobbying efforts on the governing
body.12 On the one hand, the activists and their parliamentary
representatives acted as a different kind of elite with respect to the
medico-scientific establishment, by approving a restrictive dele-
gation law without stimulating a genuine public discussion on the
matter (remember that, when this piece of legislation was
approved, most of the scientific community was in the dark as to its
content). On the other hand, the scientists countered the concerns
of the activists by pressuring the government into a legislative
compromise that disqualified non-expert opinions on the impor-
tance of animals for biomedical research, and aimed at preserving
the scientists’ stakes in the competition for resources within the
European research sector.
Against this backdrop, our aim here is to trace the imaginaries
that have shaped public discourse, including the public itself as a
discursive entity, and how interventions of key actors strengthened
them. In the midst of this dispute, a number of individual stories
caught the attention of media and triggered major mobilizations on
social networks, becoming polarizing anchors in the public
discourse and thereby offering privileged vistas on the narratives
animating this socio-political controversy. While a number of these
stories convey similar narratives,13 we take here as paradigmatic
and arguably highest-impact example the clash around the telling
vicissitudes of Caterina Simonsen, a 25 years old veterinary student
suffering from four rare and debilitating diseases who became a
national icon for both defenders and opponents of animal experi-
mentation. Her popularity began in December 2013 when Caterina
posted a picture (La Repubblica 2013a) on Facebook to support the
cause of scientists and express her gratitude to those researchers
who “gifted her with a future” thanks to “true scientific research,
which involves animal experimentation”. The reaction to her
Facebook post was violent: many alleged animal rights activists
attacked Caterina on social media, claiming that they would gladly
trade her life with that of the numerous innocent beings sacrificed
daily for experiments. The story of Caterina rapidly spread over the
major Italian newspapers (Corriere della Sera, 2013), blogs and
webpages of political parties (Amati, 2013), as well as antivivisec-
tion organizations (Lega Anti Vivisezione, 2014) and pro-animal
experimentation associations (Pro-Test, 2014) in the following
weeks. The reaction was at first glance a unanimous condemnation
of the violent language used against her: politicians, activists,
journalists, scientists and patients, on both sides of the dispute, all
stood with her proclaiming indignation over the personal attacks
she had faced.
In the aftermath of Caterina’s incident, however, many anti-
vivisectionists, while distancing themselves and their organiza-
tions from the trolling storm that had targeted her, tried to
dissect the most recent events and offer political analyses of their
roots and impact. For example, the Italian Antivivisection League
(Lega Anti Vivisezione, 2013b) deplored that the clamour
generated by Caterina’s story indeed led to an increase in public
sympathy for the ’false science’ supporting animal experimen-
tation. Various analysts went further and tried to investigate the
‘pedigree’ of the alleged offenders (discrediting their member-
ship to animal rights movements), by showing a contradiction
between the blistering attack to Caterina and some of their habits
displayed on social media, such as meat consumption, or the use
of leather clothes (Cossu, 2013; Indelicato, 2014). Others focused
instead on Caterina’s own cyber-life (D’Amico, 2013b, 2013a).
First, the fact that she shares the name with a US-based company
providing rodent housing and production for biomedical research
(i.e. Simonsen Laboratories) was used to suggest that she may
have had a vested, economic interest in animal experimentation
(D’Amico, 2013b). Second, her Facebook profile was thoroughly
scrutinized so as to highlight a controversial post where she had
attacked a court’s decision to compensate some prisoners due to
the poor conditions of their detention. Activists interpreted her
stance as displaying ruthless political views on human rights, as
if these were fundamentally tied to those expressed on non-
human animals, and thus giving her famous Facebook post a
neo-Victorian turn that suggested, when it did not positively
forge, an alliance between animals and the least privileged
humans. Most importantly, however, the reactions of antivivi-
sectionists to Caterina’s story emphasized how her defence of
animal experimentation should be understood as the result of a
broader cultural context where economic and scientific interests
conflate into an “organised propaganda” (Gallinae in Fabula,
2014) in support of such practices. In this view, Caterina was e
perhaps unintentionally e reiterating the message of a politico-
scientific establishment indifferent to an allegedly factual
disagreement on the utility of vivisection, and to the value-
conflicts arising from trading animals’ interests for the benefit
of humans. Thus, well beyond the violent reaction of those she
calls “nazi-animalists” (La Repubblica 2013b) to her support for
animal experimentation, the story of Caterina epitomizes the
core socio-political controversies at the basis of this debate,
thereby enabling the identification of three important elements
about the Italian debate that resonate with the other case we
have investigated in this work.
First, while the Italian debate reiterates the classical form of a
trade-off between animal suffering and humanwelfare through the
advancement of science, the actors balance the two sides of the
equation differently. Pro-Test defenders of “scientific freedom”,14 as
well as important representatives of the Italian scientific
11 These legislative decrees, together with the delegation law which instructs
them, have become the matter of an infringement procedure the European Com-
mission has announced against Italy (EC infringement number 20162013). Such tool
allows the Commission to sanction member states who stretch their interpretation
of a Directive beyond the limits it establishes, and thus violate the principle of
subsidiarity (i.e. the founding principle of the European political architecture that
distributes agency and jurisdiction between central European institutions and
member states).
12 Remarkably, a recent poll from IPSOS Public Affairs. (2014) shows the Italian
population to be perfectly split with regard to animal experimentation: 49% find it
totally acceptable or acceptable, and 49% find it absolutely unacceptable or unac-
ceptable. More generally, different surveys across different social groups show stark
discrepancies regarding the permissibility of animal experimentation (Hagelin,
Carlsson, & Hau, 2003), and mass media coverage likely plays an important role
in shaping these attitudes one way or another (Kruse, 2001).
13 See for example the stories of Susanna Penco (Il Giornale 2013) and Michela
Kuan (Lega Anti Vivisezione, 2014).
14 See: https://protestitalia.wordpress.com/chi-siamo. Accessed 06 December
2016.
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community such as Elena Cattaneo (both a prominent scientist and
a member of the Senate), ground the legitimacy of animal experi-
mentation on the factual recognition that science cannot yet
renounce such experiments for its progress, and address dissent as
a deficit of knowledge. Italy “is no country for scientists”, Cattaneo
recently argued, if politicians proudly support the “tribal” battle
against animal experimentation (Brocca, 2016).Within this context,
Caterina represents the embodiment of such framing. She claims to
be alive thanks to the “true research” involving non-human ani-
mals, and for this reason she decided to publicly express her sup-
port to researchers on Facebook. Her hope is to raise awareness on
the benefits produced by animal experimentation through an
anapodictic judgment: the fact that she is there does not call for any
further demonstration of the usefulness of such practice. Perhaps
insofar as based on the false premise that public knowledge is
reducible to undisputable factual statements (Jasanoff, 2007),
Caterina’s “facts” did not however persuade the activists, who had a
very different view on the trade-off. To them, Caterina abides by the
“propaganda” spread by the scientific community and the Pro-Test
activists, which ignores both an alleged disagreement among sci-
entists on the value of animal experimentation, as well as another
important element of the trade-off establishing its legitimacy: the
clash of moral interests between human and non-human animals.
Simply put, the activists deemed both unnecessary and unworthy
the suffering of the animals that had been exploited, albeit indi-
rectly, to keep Caterina alive.
Second, and in contrast to the Victorian case, the story of
Caterina reveals a perspective on scientists that is different from
the one of a sadistic torturer. Rather than the evil of the scientist,
the cause for concern here is the accountability of science and its
institutions. Indeed, Caterina is presented as an unwitting spokes-
person (she is a university student) of the propaganda on animal
experimentation. Even her misadventure, with its reverberation in
national news, was at times regarded as a plot to support the cause
of pharmaceutical companies and scientists (Fuccillo, 2014).
Caterina’s words are thus interpreted as the product of the economic
and political stakes that scientists hold in experiments involving the
use of animals. Differently from the debate characterizing Victorian
Britain, activists in the Italian case did not primarily rise as de-
fenders of moral virtues neglected by insensitive men of science.
Rather, their complaints targeted science as a social, political and e
most importantly e economic endeavor. In particular, the discourse
they held against animal experimentation and its defenders (such
as Caterina) sees scientific research as potentially open to biases
and vested private interests, calling into question the present
model of science governance in which scientists are granted public
trust in exchange for holding higher responsibilities15 than other
sectors (see also Asdal, 2008). The activists’ narrative points to the
alleged difficulties of delegating to science (i) the resolution of the
factual controversies they identify in the practice of animal
experimentation, and (ii) the containment of the powerful role of
market forces in the configuration of collective notions of legiti-
macy and justification on this matter. Simply put, the exceptional
mandate of science captured within special legislation does not
suffice, according to them, to contain the power of economic in-
centives, and to prevent the spread of propaganda in favor of “false
science” (Lega Anti Vivisezione, 2013a).
Third, besides their equivalent albeit specular engagement with
political power, the debate on the Italian adoption of the EU
directive highlights one more commonality between the elites
championing the two opposing fronts, namely the exceptionality of
science as a discursive resource that is apparently accepted by both
camps (although with due differences) not only as unproblematic
but as structuring the very boundaries of what should be discussed.
Indeed, the Italian scientific community made only few attempts
(Pro-Test Italia 2012) to link animal experimentation to other
conspicuous uses of animals, such as those entailed in industrial
farming and more generally in food and clothing production,
despite both the sheer evidence of numbers, along with a wealth of
moral arguments, readily available to counteract the salience being
attached specifically to animal experimentation. Discrepancies in
the treatment of animal experimentation and other uses of animals
are pervasive in the Italian debate on both sides of the dispute. One
example is Caterina, who declares herself vegetarian and to have
chosen veterinary studies in order “to save animals” (Corriere della
Sera, 2013), while making public her defense of animal experi-
mentation. The same discordance can be found in the way Italian
antivivisectionism addresses respectively practices of intensive
breeding, farming of animals and their use in scientific research.
The statutory and programmatic principles of major animal rights
associations operate in fact the following distinction: while the
involvement of animals in scientific research requires in their view
an “institutional commitment to alternatives” and/or “a legislative
ban”, the suffering of animals in the food industry instead calls
primarily for a “change of menu”.16 Finally, also scientists appear to
have completely internalized these discrepancies by receding to a
‘damage-control’ strategy which adopts in full the logic of the 3Rs
ethical framework (see Russell & Burch, 1959) to “Replace, Reduce
and Refine the use of animals wherever possible”. By subjecting
their practices to this ethical framework, scientific institutions thus
reproduce the unbalanced distribution of moral duties across uses
of animals in our societies, and reiterate the special status given to
science. In sum, all sides of this controversy seem to agree on the
exceptionality of science, and the need of a publicly accountable
oversight of animals’ involvement in its activities. This, we argue,
accounts (at least in part) for the shift of questions around animal
experimentation from an ethos of animal welfare to a socio-
political controversy over the collective means of controlling sci-
ence. Indeed, while meat consumption is familiar to citizens, in the
sense of falling within the responsibilities and judgements of every
consumer, the little direct oversight citizens can claim over the
means of biomedical research entails a fiduciary model whose
legitimacy is currently put into question.
The Italian case shows how contemporary controversies around
animal experimentation are neither simply due to public ignorance
(as the Pro-Test activists and major scientific figures have argued;
see Brocca, 2016), nor solely to the different “value” scientists and
the public assign to the sacrifice of non-human sentient beings for
human interests. Within the Italian context, as the confrontations
growing out of Caterina’s story show, antivivisectionism directs its
critical discourse at the place that political disagreements and
public concerns hold in the governance of animal experimentation.
Different degrees of expertise, basic epistemic disagreements
(concerning what animal experimentation ought to be good for)
and normative clashes usher into a distrustful account of the Italian
institutional arrangements to control science e framed as an
exceptional domain of activity and hence accountable to a special15 This higher responsibility is for instance embodied in the country’s legislation.
As prescribed by the law 189e2004 (Gazzetta Ufficiale 2004) and the legislative
decree 26e2014 (Gazzetta Ufficiale 2014), failing to kill or anaesthetize a test ani-
mal leads to financial sanctions and a potential revocation of the research project’s
authorization to conduct animal research, thus imposing sanctions to such scientific
misconduct which add to, and are greater than the penal sanctions already foreseen
in the general penal code for crimes against animals.
16 See: http://www.lav.it/cosa-facciamo/allevamenti-e-alimentazione; http://
www.lav.it/cosa-facciamo/vivisezione; http://www.lacoscienzadeglianimali.it/
index.php/il-manifesto. Accessed 06 December 2016.
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political mandate e and their effectiveness in restraining its sus-
ceptibility to economic and political interests.
4. The European Citizens’ Initiative
The Italian controversy was echoed at the continental scale
through the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)17 Stop Vivisection,
registered in 2012 (ECI (2012)000007) and submitted to the
European Commission on 03/03/2015 after having accumulated
considerably more than the required one million signatures in
several member countries. Interestingly, the vast majority of the
signatures were gathered in Italy (Fig. 1A), and a considerable
portion of the ECI’s budget came from Italian associations (ECI
website). In fact, according to Google search trends, search queries
for “stop vivisection” were in the last 4 years virtually all coming
from Italy, leading in 2014 to a major spike in the worldwide search
trends (Fig. 1B).
The ECI asked the Commission to abrogate the aforementioned
European Directive 2010/63/EU on animal experimentation and
effectively phase out animal experimentation. The directive, which
was touted as “among the world’s most advanced pieces of legis-
lation concerning animal welfare”, builds upon the 3Rs ethical
framework (see Russell & Burch, 1959) and commits to the
“development, validation and uptake” of alternative methods
(C(2015) 3773; Directive 2010/63, art. 47). In other words, the
directive purports to do just what the ECI asked e phasing out,
albeit gradually, animal experimentation. Such alternative methods
are in fact, according to the legislator, not yet available (Directive
2010/63, L276/34). Predictably, therefore, after a public hearing18 in
front of the Commission on the 6th of May 2015, the EU reported its
final decision (on June 3rd) not to alter the current legislation and
to continue its current efforts in reducing the use of animals in
research and developing alternatives. Stop Vivisection came, in the
words of the European Commission, “at a time of transition” when
the “significant progress in the development of alternative ap-
proaches” does not qualify yet as sufficient ground for complete
replacement of animal experimentation (C(2015) 3773, p.2). Un-
surprisingly, the response of the Commission solved none of the
contentions of the ECI’s promoters.
Fig. 1. A: Proportion of signatures obtained in each top country for the ECI “Stop Vivisection”. B: Google search trends for three relevant keywords during the course of the ECI. C:
Tweets for key hashtags in the months surrounding the ECI hearing.
17 A mechanism of the European Union enables citizens to force the Commission
to discuss an issue by gathering enough signatures from enough countries. At the
time of this writing, all three Citizens’ Initiatives were quickly dismissed, making
this mechanism yet another parody of democracy.
18 The recording of the ECI Hearing is available on the website of the European
Parliament at the following address: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/
committees/video?event¼20150511-1500-COMMITTEE-AGRI-ENVI-ITRE-PETI (last
accessed 06 December 2016).
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To understand the motivations behind the ECI, it is in fact worth
noting that Stop Vivisection differed considerably from traditional
animal protection campaigns. As the organizers repeatedly
emphasized, the primary grounds for their rejection of animal
experimentation were scientific, rather than ethical19 e or ethical
insofar they concerned human rather than animal welfare. They
contended that Directive 2010/63 erroneously assumed that “the
use of live animals continues to be necessary to protect human and
animal health”; an assumption claimed to be both “confusing” and
“out of step with modern knowledge of [.] the human and animal
body” (Annex III of the ECI Dossier, 2015, p.30). “The real truth”, the
ECI Dossier claims, “is that animal testing has never been vali-
dated.” (p.3). Thus, the ECI proponents not only argued that animal
experimentation is unnecessary, but that it is so inefficient a means
for toxicology studies, and biomedical research in general, that it is
literally a danger for citizens’ health. The ECI Dossier provides what
its proponents consider to be extensive evidence in support of “our
inability to tackle [.] with adequate scientific methods” (p.7) the
dramatic increase in all major morbidities (from cancer to diabetes
and autism) affecting human health. This claim is framed in a crisis
rhetoric, ranging from repeatedly blaming the so-called drug
development crisis (decreasing number of drugs approved per
million invested) on “the failings of animal-based biomedical
research” (McIvor, ECI hearing), to more apocalyptic scenarios
threatening the survival of our species (Reiss, 2014, a message to
candidates for the European Parliament).
As with Victorian antivivisection, it is interesting to note that
each side respectively presents both replacement and continuation
of animal experimentation as threats for human lives. “We don’t
want human beings to be the real guinea pigs”, Tamino and the ECI
organizers kept hammering during the hearing, and yet their so-
lution relies at least in part on epidemiology (e.g. Menache &
Nastrucci, 2012) and hence on human subjects. Nonetheless, to
them such a careful post-marketing epidemiological monitoring
appears considerably safer than the current testing standards
involving animals. However, despite the fact that proponents of the
ECI claim scientific evidence to be on their side and provide
numerous references for their position, there is a near consensus
against it in the scientific community. A number of associations and
organizations supporting the use of animals in biomedical research
have questioned the claims of the ECI’s proponents. Alternative
explanations to the figures presented in the Dossier can be found on
the websites of Cancer Research UK (2015), The Alzheimer’s
Association (2015) and Diabetes UK (2014) e to name a few (see
also Eyal, Hart, Onculer, Oren, & Rossi, 2010 regarding the pur-
ported rise in autism). Scientific interest groups such as the League
of European Research Universities, as well as bodies involved in
research for alternatives to animal experimentation, such as the
Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments
(FRAME) and the Virtual Physiological Human project, all posi-
tioned themselves against Stop Vivisection. Similarly, a 2011 survey
conducted by the Nature Publishing Group reported that 92% of the
surveyed scientists agreed with the statement that “Animal
research is essential to the advancement of biomedical science”
(Cressey, 2011, p. 453).
Therefore, while the debate shows a more or less widespread
agreement across all parties that animal experimentation should be
replaced, the terrain of the dispute appears to be the official posi-
tion of the scientific community; namely, the “fact” that “we are not
there yet” (O’Keefe et al., 2015). Behind this view is indeed the claim
that animal experimentation is a “necessary evil”, a position which
the Commission’s answer simply reiterates, notwithstanding that
this is precisely what proponents of the Initiative are arguing
against. Animal experiments, the ECI proponents claim, are so
misleading that they cannot be useful, much less necessary. Yet, and
despite its claims to be “in the hearing mode” (Katainen, ECI
hearing), the Commission seemed to turn a deaf ear to this concern,
coming across to the anti-vivisectionsists as having “avoid[ed] the
scientific arguments regarding animal experimentation” (Stop
Vivisection, 2016). And while the ECI’s committee and experts
legitimized their claims on the basis of the evidence they recruited
(their dossier contains in the order of hundreds scientific refer-
ences), scientists (and the Commission) merely repeated instead
what they considered to be obvious: that most progresses of
medicine have rested on animal experimentation and must
necessarily continue to do so. Nobel laureate Françoise Barre-
Sinoussi, who participated to the hearings as an expert, seemed
to consider it sufficient to ask, in a rhetorical manner, “Do you really
think we didn’t learn anything from animal testing?”
This dialogue of deaf was fostered by a systematic misalignment
of the two camps over the very object of the dispute, namely the
scope of animal experimentation, with an impressive display of
discursive resources and epistemic arguments side-stepping each
other. Thus, although proponents of the Initiative do cite several
damning reviews and meta-reviews, their line of argument is
limited to evidence on the so-called predictive usages of animal
experimentation, such as toxicology testing and drug screenings.
Ray Greek, who was summoned to speak by ECI proponents as an
expert on animal experimentation (and very much insisted on his
expertise), is fully aware of this, and repeatedly wrote in his articles
that his claims apply to these predictive usages, and not to funda-
mental research:
“There is no doubt that careful biological studies of rats and mice
can help clarify the general contours of mammalian biology. Such
studies can also play a valuable heuristic role by prompting new
ways of thinking about human biological problems of interest.
The issue we are concerned with is this: notwithstanding these
cautions, are animal models predictive of human outcomes in,
say, toxicology, drug discovery, and the study of the causes and
cures of human diseases?” (Shanks & Greek, 2009, p.29,
emphasis added)
Yet, in his presentation at the ECI’s hearing, Greek remained
silent on such fundamental qualification of the evidence shown,
and rather presented his arguments against “the minimal role” that
animal tests have played in biomedical progress, by brushing over
the fact that the ECI targets all of animal experimentation. As
McIvor of the Humane Society notes,
“one of the things that I appreciate most about this Citizen
Initiative is that the focus has moved from regulatory testing to
all of the other uses of animals, and that of course includes
biomedical research. [.] This Citizen Initiative is the opportu-
nity of the animal protection community to bring biomedical
research back onto agenda, and in a much bigger way, in a way
that reflects the fact that over 90% of the animals used in the
European Union are used for fundamental and applied
biomedical research.” (McIvor, ECI hearing)
This is a critical point, and one of irreducible disagreement be-
tween the parties, for it shows how the evidence recruited by
supporters of the ECI does not support the claim that animal
19 In this regard, the arguments of the ECI’s proponents can be inscribed in the
broader trend towards ‘evidence-based activism’ already identified in other Euro-
pean contexts such as patient advocacy organizations in France, Ireland, Portugal
and UK (see Rabeharisoa et al., 2014).
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experimentation is not necessary for biomedical researchwrit large.
However, the debates following the experts’ contribution to the
hearing was precisely not focused on this issue, and instead reveals
to what extent a prima facie factual controversy on the utility of
animal testing was far from being addressed at a technical level.
Nor was there any discussion of whether scientific research could
produce “greater goods” other than medically actionable knowl-
edge. In other words, it would be mistaken to interpret the un-
convincing response of the scientific community as betraying a lack
of reasons: there was a case to be made, which none of the actors
deemed useful or necessary to make.
Interestingly, the intervention by McIvor at the hearing took off
from a historical reconstruction of the 1993 action against the use
of animals in cosmetic testing, requiring a ban on the commer-
cialization of products derived from it. Politicians, she argued, took
action upon the voiced protests of citizens, but the effective
implementation of the ban (Regulation 1223/2009) required a
major effort to come to terms with the economic interests in
cosmetic testing. This concern for economic interests behind ani-
mal experimentation was echoed in the intervention of Claude
Reiss, who highlighted that different animal models respond very
differently to the same compounds, noting e beyond the simple
fact that it casts some doubt on their ability to predict human
response e that this allowed chemical and pharmaceutical in-
dustries to cherry-pick their animal model for toxicity testing.
“This,” he said, “is very handy for the producers who want to
market a given chemical, but the reverse side of the coin is that it is
a disaster for human health” (Reiss, ECI hearing). And herein lies the
core of the controversy: animal testing, the whole regulatory
framework including directive 2010/63/EU, and in the end the Eu-
ropean Commission itself, are all seen by the ECI proponents as
failing to fulfil their function of neutrality, having been captured by
“vested interests” (Greek 2015/05/15), and merely “help[ing] the
pharma consortia” (Eck, Independent MEP, Germany, ECI hearing).
“The pharmaceutical industry is duping us”, said another MEP (Evi,
ECI hearing)20.
Writing after the decision of the Commission, Greek was
considerably more damning. In a blog post, he summarized the
discussion as follows:
“That is what happened in Brussels: the [European Commission]
was untouched by education but heavily swayed by the vested
interest groups that gain from the status quo. Animal modeling
is not going to end by appealing to those that profit from it nor
by appealing to those who are controlled by those who profit
from it.” (Greek 2015/06/06)
Greek’s accusations are not merely aimed at politicians and in-
dustry, but also very much at scientists. In opening his talk at the
hearing, after insisting on not having a financial interest in the
issue, he observed:
“The reason I include the fact that I have no financial interest in
the outcome is because many people quote surveys that have
been conducted that purport to show that almost all scientists
support the use of animals in research and testing. These sur-
veys are misleading as 1) almost all the respondents do have a
financial interest in animal modeling, and 2) none of the surveys
addresses [.] the predictive value of animal modeling as a
modality.” (Greek, ECI hearing)
Indeed, in an earlier blog post Greek even accused the Fund for
the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments (FRAME) of
having an interest in, in fact, delaying the very replacement they are
supposed to foster: “FRAME needs more of your money so they can
spread their propaganda to more of society who will then give
them even more money” (Greek 2015/05/15).
The economic interests are seen as all the more threatening in
that they act, just like the practice of science, hidden from public
sight, and hence escape democratic control. Indeed, transparency
was by far the most recurrent issue raised by MEPs. Echoing
Cobbe’s making “light into the dark places” (1885), Italian MEP
Fabio Massimo Castaldo said: “I think that there’s a clear trans-
parency issue, because we don’t really know what is happening
behind the closed doors of the lab”, and even suggested that “the
official statistics are probably fiddled with”. Similarly, Nicola
Caputo (another Italian MEP) pressed that “we need to make sure
that animal testing is more transparent [.] those who use animal
testing should present information on the objectives and targets of
the project [.] themember states shouldmake it publicly available
so that the citizens knowwhat’s happening in the labs” (Caputo, ECI
hearing). Importantly, the European Institutions themselves are
also perceived as lacking transparency and not representing the
citizens: “it’s not just the pharmaceutical industry, it’s the European
agencies that are acting in an untransparent way.” (Evi, ECI hear-
ing). As noted by Mr. Eck,
“we need to see the fact that there is a value change in our so-
ciety. Animals cannot be seen as a pure good to be exploited for
whatever testing. If the Commission does not accept this
initiative then you are gonna see what little remaining faith in
the EU institutions is there at the moment will disappear in the
future” (Eck, ECI hearing).
The application of Directive 2010/63 is perceived, in other
words, as the legacy of a scientific “conservatism” (Mc Ivor, ECI
hearing), and e as one of the organizers of the initiative puts it e a
“betray[al of] public trust” (Menache, ECI hearing).21 Consequently,
both the organizers of the ECI and many of the MEPs have
repeatedly asked for “an open and broad debate without any
prejudice” (Caputo, ECI hearing) e a debate not only about what is
“obviously wrong” in science (Heubech, ECI hearing), but also a
scientific debate that is inclusive rather than deferred to a scientific
establishment:
“The obstacle here is not the science, it’s communicating a very
complex message, which obviously we couldn’t do today with
experts speaking for 10 minutes or less. We need a serious sci-
entific debate, because I thinkwewill win this scientific debate.”
(Menache, ECI hearing)
According to the Stop Vivisection committee (Stop Vivisection,
2016), both the scientific community and the European in-
stitutions failed to meet the requests, or provide an elaborate
rebuttal of the arguments of the citizens they seek to serve. The ECI
was neither used as instrument of citizen-led politics in the Union,
nor taken as an opportunity to discuss the knowledge and values at
the basis of EU policy undertakings. The former would have
required EU authorities to address the problem of animal
20 Another noted that “Very often when it comes to animal modeling we get in-
formation skewed in the interest of big companies and big medicine” (open
questions, ECI hearing).
21 Similar concerns can also be found in the recent report of the Oxford Centre for
Animal Ethics, which highlights problems in the current legal framework, especially
conflicts of interest (p.54) and a “lack of transparency e if not outright secrecy”
(WGOCAE, 2015, p.44).
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experimentation starting from the concerns raised by the ECI, while
the latter would have instead demanded a much deeper charac-
terization and discussion of the factual claims in support of, or
against animal experimentation. Instead, none of these two ap-
proaches has influenced the political establishment and its scien-
tific delegates in their framing or discussion of the issue. As already
shown by Jasanoff (2007, chapter 3), European Institutions have
always been perceived as distant from the polity they purport to
represent. Our case study shows that the problems of legitimacy
and transparency remained just as salient despite the introduction
of the ECI instrument, which was preciselymeant to remedy to EU’s
deficiencies of representation.
Furthermore, the ECI represented a major change in the reper-
toire of antivivisectionists’ arguments, shifting the battlefield from
moral claims to the scientist’s own arsenal e the language of facts.
And yet, rather than accepting to joust with this new opponent on
the scientific battleground, the European political and scientific
establishment preferred to displace power from the weapon to the
wielder. Karl Falkenberg, the Director General for Environment of
the EU Commission, noted that the initiative’s experts had certainly
made their presentation “in good faith”, but that “in real life, sci-
entific committees are still arguing” (Falkenberg, ECI hearing), thus
suggesting that the “true science” on animal experimentation, and
consequently not the one recruited by the ECI proponents, is far
from settling the question about its epistemic value. Along the
same line of reasoning, the chairman concluded the hearings on the
same note: “we want to have the highest standards in Europe, but
we also need to remember the limits of science” (Siekierski, ECI
hearing).
5. Discussion
Throughout our analysis we have argued that the animal
experimentation debate revolves not only, and indeed not even
primarily, around the welfare of animals, but rather around the
perceived power and (lack of) accountability of science and its in-
stitutions. This is perhaps best illustrated in the earlier passage
from a 1880 antivivisection pamphlet enjoining the reader to vote
for a representative who opposes vivisection on the ground that
“you may be tolerably sure that in other questions he will support
the cause of theweak against the strong” (quoted in French,1975, p.
166). Animals, insofar as they are helpless, are the site at which, or
the object on which, power reveals its arbitrary or unfathomable
character. It appears therefore that, in antivivisectionism, the
despotism of such power is more at stake than its consequences for
animals. This is, in turn, the explanation we provide for the
exceptionality of science, i.e. why laboratory animals appear to
matter more than other animals in our societies. Indeed, while
meat-consumption, for instance, appears to be protected by the
familiarity of citizens’ daily life, science is perceived as the obscure
privilege of elected few, whose ends and means, in terms of the
common good, appear to lie beyond public scrutiny and require a
leap of faith from the layman.
As we have shown above, Victorian antivivisectionism provides
particularly illustrative examples of dynamics that have partly
persisted until today. First, linking feminist politics with anti-
vivisectionism through the lens of the ontologies of vulnerability
suggests that science’s exceptionalism rests on its collusion with
power and its elements of unchecked accountability. Second, the
Victorian concern regarding the role of emotions and popular voi-
ces in the governance of animal experimentation challenges rea-
sons, interests and utility calculus as the sole means to adjudicate
its legitimacy. Indeed, both today’s dismissal of popular voices as
ignorant and sentimentalist (like in the Italian case), and the
citizen-led hijack of the logic of utility calculus to disprove animal
experimentation (like in the ECI) all seem to grapple with a ques-
tion strangely similar to that of women in Victorian Britain: who
should be allowed to evaluate this practice, and through what
means? Third, and very much related to the first elements, science
comes across as secluded in the antivivisectionist imaginary:
practised in secrecy by men whose heartless obsession and eso-
terism set apart from the rest of society. Scientists and scientific
institutions are regarded by its critics, through the lens of anti-
vivisectionism, as all themore threatening in that their power is out
of the public’s reach: (i) set apart from mundane life and from the
triggers of both liberating and reactionary movements in the
Victorian imaginary, (ii) taken over by economic interests in the
Italian case; (iii) unresponsive to the demands of organised citi-
zenry (against, among other things, those same economic interests)
in the case of Stop Vivisection. As shown by Asdal (2008), animal
experimentation is a paradigmatic example of how experimental
medicine has been accommodated in society since the 19th cen-
tury. By conceding to scientists the possibility of inflicting the kind
of suffering on animals that is not granted to any citizen in ordinary
contexts, she argues, the laboratory turns from a secluded space
(impermeable to societal interests) to a specified space of society.
Our work qualifies this notion further, by tracing the key resource
through which this specification occurs, namely the severing of
research from other uses of animals in society on the basis of an
exceptional framing of science. Through this lens, our cases repre-
sent thus distinct but largely convergent historical occurrences of
how animals get recruited, across different contexts, as a paradig-
matic testing ground of a trade-off between secludedness and
specification.
Of course, there are also important differences between our
time and Victorian England. First, and despite the massive rise in
meat consumption throughout the last century, concern with ani-
mal welfare has grown to be part of mainstream public discourses.
Animal ethics and animal rights movements have attempted to
change, with increasing success, the way we eat, the clothes we
wear, and shaped new collective responsibilities for the protection
of animal welfare (from regulations on livestock farming to the
banning of cosmetic testing in animals). This broader trend
certainly influenced antivivisectionist movements, and marks
distinct ways of consolidating animals’ role in biomedical research
in the different historical contexts we analysed. Yet, our case
studies show that we would be only partly capturing the nature of
the controversy if we stopped at this narrative of moral progress. In
fact, the debate is not just about a moral dimension being recog-
nised: at least in the two contemporary cases analysed above, the
value of animal lives is rather assumed by all sides of these con-
troversies as an undisputable commitment. Differently from the
Victorian debate, the matter is not deciding whether animals suffer,
or whether they are worth of any sort of moral consideration. Our
contemporary cases rather revolve around the need to establish
acceptable constraining procedures for governing the acknowl-
edged conflicts between moral concerns for other species and the
tecnoscientific options of biomedical innovation.
Second, another difference between Victorian times and the
recent cases pertains to how the scientist is publicly represented.22
In brief, Victorian antivivisectionism lacks the breadth of the
industrialized and neoliberal economy in which science is nowa-
days inscribed. This is visible in some of the arguments provided
for, or against vivisection. For instance, Richard Owen’s defence of
vivisection, more than a century ago, emphasized the gratuitous
cruelty of hunting (Owen, 1882, pp. 35e36) to downplay the
22 Shapin (2008) offers an excellent analysis of perceptions (both self-perceptions
and outside perceptions) of scientists from the mid-19th century to this day.
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“necessary evils” of vivisection, while more recently a US report
instead emphasized “the 5 billion animals used annually for food,
clothing, and other purposes in the United States” (Committee on
the Use of Laboratory Animals, 1988, p.2). The change of language
from the cruelty of the practices to the sheer amount of animals
involved marks also a shift in the nature of public representation of
science. Today’s image of the scientist is not anymore that of the
perverse vivisector, who sadistically tortures animals in a secluded
laboratory, and may thus benefit from the comparison with sport
hunting. Rather, the public perception of the scientist has gradually
changed to take a more socio-economic dimension, which is
nevertheless not entirely discontinuous with the ruthless and often
perverse logic attributed to nineteenth century vivisectors. Indeed,
while scientists repeatedly proclaimed their “normality” in reaction
to the fearsome picture of the “mad scientist”23, they simulta-
neously became “just one more of society’s interest groups” (Feuer,
1963), whose stakes might well come to conflict with that of lay
citizens.24 The scientist is therefore represented as a powerful actor
on the political stage, and one of its most recurrent figures is that of
the scientist entrepreneur25, understood either literally (especially
in the American scene, see Shapin, 2008, p. 17) or figuratively as the
careerist researcher. In both cases, the entrepreneurial ethos con-
flicts with the fiduciary model of science in the antivivisectionist’s
discourse, and questions the academic freedom of individual sci-
entists. As Norbert Wiener once described it, the 20th century has
seen “the degradation of the position of the scientist as an inde-
pendent worker and thinker to that of morally irresponsible stooge
in a science-factory” (Wiener 1948; quoted in Feuer, 1963, p. 399).
Such an image of scientists and science is evident in the Italian case
we analysed above, through the illustrative story of Caterina
Simonsen. In fact, antivivisection activists present her at best as a
victim of false scientific propaganda, or downright indict her of
being part of the economic establishment misguiding science. Here
lies the interesting difference brought about by the contemporary
cases vis à vis the historical reconstruction of early anti-
vivisectionism we provided. Science is no more abnormal because
of the hideous nature of some of its members, but rather hijacked
by economic and political interests unaccountable for, when not
positively in conflict with the common good. Very much like the
Golem who turns against the community it is supposed to help,
science is perceived by opponents of animal experimentation as a
“creature of our art and craft” (Collins & Pinch, 1993, p. 2) that has
betrayed her mandate, the epiphenomenon of a broader malaise
towards the dominance of vested interests over the common good.
Importantly, the issue is most often not so much about the pur-
ported greed of scientists unwilling to sacrifice, say, a career and
fame built on animal models in the name of scientific integrity: like
Caterina Simonsen or the Golem, scientists are most often seen as
unwitting participants to the systemic dysfunction of science.
Consequently, science cannot regain public legitimacy from its elite
and bureaucrats, or by knowledge dissemination: it instead re-
quires a direct encounter with the citizenry, starting with the
protests voiced by its representatives.26
The value and necessity of this grass-root renegotiation of sci-
ence in the polity has been analysed in the work of Callon,
Lascoumes and Barthes (2009), who have shown how the recog-
nition of uncertainties inherent to sociotechnical controversies
reformulates problems and questions that had been assumed to
have been already clearly laid out, largely through a reconfiguration
of political and scientific actors in a new public space: hybrid fo-
rums. These represent the refusal of the so-called double-delega-
tion, i.e. the respective delegation of decision-making to political
and scientific experts as neatly allocated spokespersons for,
respectively, values and facts. Hybrid forums “short-circuit” this
division through the development of new public spaces where
experts, politicians and laypersons can engage each other in solving
such controversies. Hybrid forums are thus a place for discussing
“the border between what is technical and social”, and “introduce
an indeterminacy that will not be settled until the end of [a] con-
troversy” (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009, p. 26). In some way,
all three cases display a refusal of, or at least a resistance to, the
double-delegation model: new groups and actors contributed to
reconfigure the practice of animal experimentation, both on
epistemic and sociopolitical grounds in these three different con-
texts. From the emergence of underrepresented voices and senti-
ments in the Victorian case, through that of pro-science activists’
association Pro-Test in the Italian debate, to the networking and
scientific backing of antivivisectionist advocacy groups in the case
of the ECI, all these debates entailed a socio-political, as well as
technical exploration of (new) actors, objects, public fora and col-
lectives engaged in the debate over science’s authority in infringing
animal welfare.
Prima facie the ECI can be regarded as a particularly clear-cut
example of how hybrid forums handle controversies at different
levels, and from a diverse array of perspectives. Experts, politicians
and citizens were given the opportunity, thanks to the institutional
tool of Citizens’ Initiatives, to address the problems of animal
experimentation within ethical, technical and economic domains
alike. Yet, as shown above, Stop Vivisection represents also the
example of a failure of EU’s scientific and political elites to engage
with the public in a consideration of the values and facts that the
initiative questioned. The result of the ECI therefore adds to the
account of Callon et al. (2009) an exploration of the potential ways
to defuse the political creativity of hybrid forums in the midst of
major public outcries. Far from being committed to the renegotia-
tion of identities and questions that pertain to the factual, as well as
value-laden dimensions of animal experimentation, the ECI gran-
ted only a pro forma renegotiation of the governance of this prac-
tice. By requiring the decision of fading out experiments involving
animals to depend on a simple hearing of experts from both sides,
which in the end appeared to have no actual impact on the
decision-making process, the ECI did not challenge the existing
stakes and interests on animal experimentation. Rather, it rein-
forced the idea that the political and epistemic grounds of the
controversy are to be distinguished, and that it is the responsibility
of experts (in both politics and science) to give closure to the
debate. In this framing, animal experimentation remained there-
fore out of reach of the organised citizenry, and this represented a
very effective weapon against the dialogic and political creativity of
the ECI qua hybrid forum. In a nutshell, the confrontation did not
produce the renegotiation of interests, identities and categories of
collective thinking about animal experimentation, which the
23 See especially the passage on Charles Percy Snow in Shapin (2008), p. 65.
24 Indeed, O’Brien noted that based on the US General Social Survey, “the extent to
which scientists are thought to serve the nation’s best interests is the strongest
determinant of attitudes about scientists as policy advisors.” (O’Brien, 2012, p.7).
25 Interestingly, this image was already prefigured in the Victorian era by what
French described as the “self-interested scientific entrepreneurs” (French, 1975, p.
299, original emphasis).
26 It is interesting to note that a recent collaborative effort at establishing an
interdisciplinary agenda on issues surrounding laboratory animal science identified
“openness and public engagement” as a key issue to be fostered, and raises as one
of its most urgent question: “How is the credibility of animal models and non-
animal alternatives constructed, decided upon and challenged in different con-
texts?” (Davies et al., 2016) This also opens up a potentially productive parallel
between the cases discussed here and general trends towards participation in
biomedicine: the debate on animal experimentation can be seen as an example of a
broader movement towards a renegotiation of roles and responsibilities in the
governance of scientific innovation between the general public and the scientific
establishment (Del Savio, Buyx, & Prainsack, 2016).
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dialogic democracy of hybrid forums would require. Being more
concerned with an exercise of a particular kind of democracy e
namely, the delegative model in which facts are provided by ex-
perts and decisions are made by politics against the ochlocracy of
organised citizens e the whole ECI mechanism has resisted, pretty
much by institutional design, the potential of hybrid forums to
create richer communities and collectives around the issues raised
by technoscience. Neither the claim that animal experiments are
unnecessary to biomedical research, nor the judgement that animal
welfare deserves higher protection in the European polity, ended
up being genuinely opened up for challenge, let alone renegotiated
through these initiatives. Rather, at least in the eyes of its sup-
porters, the ECI ended up representing a largely unsuccessful
testing of the regulatory landscape and democratic accountability
of European scientific and political institutions:
“Wewere told that the European Citizens Initiatives would allow
one million citizens to participate directly in the development of
EU policies, but the current events, as with the previous other
ECIs, show that citizens participation provided by the Treaties is
pure illusion. (Stop Vivisection, 2016; emphasis added).
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